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Abstract 
 
Afghanistan’s unique geopolitical attributes have made it a centre of rivalry among great powers. The 1979 Soviet 
military intervention set in a new of war and chaos which  in turn brought critical changes within the geo-political 
environment of Afghanistan. Literature suggests that the Soviet Union ocupation was merely the curtailment of the 
United States in the region and more so an idealogical thing. This study sought to examine empirically the veracity 
of this proposition. Empirical data were collected from 88 purposively sampled Afghan respondents a number of 
whom were then selected for further in-depth interviews. The data were analyzed by using SPSS 16 in terms of 
descriptive statistics, and the one way ANOVA to investigate the differences of socio-demographic data (education, 
profession and ethnicity) in order to gain insight into perceived differences of USSR economic investment and 
politics in Afghanistan. The result showed that significant differences were observed as a result of the USSR 
economic investment and politics in Afghanistan, especially with respect to socioeconomic variables such as 
education level, ethnicity and professions. Interestingly, 72.7 per cent of respondents perceived USSR occupation as 
having been favourable to Afghans’ incomes while the same percentage disagreed that the USSR presence had 
helped reducing insurgence and terrorism. In conclusion, the USSR occupation of Afghanistan was perceived  as 
having some positive impacts with respect to economic investment  and politics. However, when taken together 
negative impacts abound as many respondents did not agree that the occupation was favourable to the Afghan 
people. 
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Introduction 
 
Afghanistan’s unique geopolitical attributes have brought about a profound impact on developments 
within the countries of the South and Central Asian regions. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
the 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan sets in a new era of war and chaos, this in turn has 
brought critical changes within the geopolitical environment of Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention was 
challenged by a number of interlinked forces - local Afghan, regional and international (among them the 
US). This has ushered in a new age according to Koch (2006) in quote, stated that “the ‘New Great 
Game’ discourse, and its historical antecedent, the ‘Great Game’ between Russia and the United 
Kingdom, continues to frame many understandings of Central Asia’s strategic importance today”.  Koch 
went on to sight (Fuller, 1992, 1994; Hunter, 1996; Johnson, 2007; Rashid, 2002) and argued that the 
Realist writings around geopolitics in the locale have a tendency to map it likewise as indeed a scenery to 
the term ‘Real Drama’ sanctioned by the power that be, in this case, the United States, Russia or 
China.The activation of these new forces and the trans-national functional linkages that enabled them to 
operate were to have a transformative impact on the whole region. The repercussions of the Soviet 
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occupation of Afghanistan, however, are not only evident in today Afghanistan’s economy, but also in the 
sociopolitical sphere of Afghanistan. The purpose of this paper is to explore these important effects on the 
Afghanistan’s economy and politics. This study investigates the extent of the impact of USSR occupation 
on Afghanistan’s economy between 1979 through 1989.  
 
 
Literature review 
 
The literature review presented in this section explains the essential historical context of the Soviet 
Union’s role in Afghanistan. The Red Army invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. At the time, the 
Soviet Union claimed the invasion was a response to requests for aid from the newly established People’s 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which was attempting to legitimize itself in an ideologically, 
socially, and politically divided Afghanistan. The overthrow of the former King Zahir Shah in 1973 had 
led to the establishment of Communist Afghanistan (and eventually the Soviet invasion).  
Another important factor to consider that lead to the Russian’s invasion of Afghanistan is not only 
geopolitical but  ideological. The communists took power in Afghanistan in 1978 and threaten to move 
from feudal state to a communist state using force. With all their empty promises provide education for 
women and girls and to ensure that women were not slaves of men. The use of force to change the 
political setting of Afghans by the communist was because of traditional and Islamic beliefs and the 
influence of Muslim clergy in the country (Braithwaite, 2011). 
The Russians decided to face mutual threats in Afghanistan using their own political and economic 
interests. These interests sometimes clash and resulted in military rivalry. Russia attempted to expand 
their military bases across Central Asia. The military rivalry between the two countries is similar to their 
military race during the Cold War because Russia’s main purpose of the military pact in the region was to 
curtail American expansion in the region. Most countries of the Central Asia regarded the US as a more 
stable partner in achieving economic potentials hence tends to create a pact with the US than the USSR or 
China (Pipinashvili, 2011) although the Soviet Union saw the spreads of NATO to the countries of 
Caucasian and Central Asian regions as a threat and to have military influence in the region.  
 
Education in Afghanistan  
 
Foreign aid supported the expansion of the education sector in Afghanistan over the years. The school 
population was estimated at 1,350 in 1932 and in 1950s, was over 100,000. By 1978, it reached over 1 
million, with nearly 90 per cent in primary education (Rubin, 1995). Much of the secondary education 
took place in the large urban centres.  In 1959, Kabul, with 1.8 per cent of the country’s population had 
nearly 74 per cent of the secondary school students. Rubin (1995) noted that data on the enrollment of 
students by gender are scarce, however, of the 2004 schools during the period of 1969 – 70 only 348 
(12%) were listed as girls’ schools.  Co-educational school existed in Kabul, but just a few of them, and 
girls comprised about 13% of the student population of 580,000 (Dupree, 1980).  With the establishment 
of Kabul University and the Polytechnic Institute, supported through aid (from France, Germany, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union) tertiary education expanded from some 500 students in the early 
1950s to over 20,000 by the late 1970s. The increased recruitment of the educated elite into an expanding 
bureaucracy and army further separated the Government from its rural constituency. 
 
Economic change 
 
Over the years Afghanistan’s economy is dominated by primary products. Such products as natural gas, 
fruits and nuts, karakul, pelts, cotton, carpet and wool are then exported to the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Iran. According to the World Bank (2001), agriculture provided about 50 
percent of the country’s GNP. The industrial base of the Afghanistan government remains relatively low 
and hence limited to small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer and cement; 
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handwoven carpets; natural gas, oil, coal, and copper. Estimates of employment vary, but most sources 
indicate that agriculture and animal husbandry employed some 65 – 70 per cent of the working 
population, industry about 10 percent, construction about 6 per cent and trade about 5 per cent, with 
services a further 11 per cent (CIA, 2013) 
Afghanistan has an economy that not only is active, but must also be understood in order to ensure a 
stable system of government. This is why Rubin (2000) contends that the state-led modernization 
programs resulted in the very split of the Afghan economy and society. Hence the divisions between the 
urban and rural sectors.  It also underscores a point that any development should take note of the hard 
contribution of the rural championed\agricultural sector that has provided for the Afghan rural populace 
and supported even the urban sector as well in terms of sustaining and taxable income during export.  
Present time indicates that 38% of the economy is devoted to agriculture while 24% of the economy is 
devoted to industry. The remaining 38% is in the services sector. A common path to development has 
been the move away from an agriculturally based (agrarian) economy. 
 
Soviet and Afghan economic development 
 
The Soviet-Afghan economic ties with USSR had a long history of trade relations (Minkov & Smolynec, 
2007). In 1955, an Afghan – Soviet treaty was renewed, giving the Soviet Union more influence in the 
former’s economic and political sphere. Sources had it that by 1978, Afghanistan was the third largest 
recipient of Soviet aid (Minkov & Smolynec, 2007). Citing Noorzoy’s work on “Economic Relations”, 
Minkov & Smolynec (2007) contends that when compared, the US aid to Afghanistan was only one third 
of the Soviet aid. These stood at $471 million $1,265 billion respectively in 1978. About 2,000 Soviet 
technical and economic experts and advisers were present in Afghanistan in 1978. The Soviet Union was 
involved in many projects then in Afghanistan. Such projects include, building apartment complexes, as 
well as in large economic development projects. Others include, building the concrete highway system 
connecting the Soviet border with Kabul and Kandahar and which, was the longest highway tunnel in the 
world.  
Military aids and cooperation was most important for the USSR with the view of strengthening the 
Afghanistan’s (DRA) security forces. Noorzoy (1985), holds that the period 1968-79, saw a total Soviet 
aid to Afghanistan at an estimated US$695 million. The military aid gradually increased until 1984, when 
it reached 366.3 million rubles a 37% increase from 1980. Between 1985 and 1988, with stepped up 
efforts for transferring the security responsibilities to the Afghan army and Red Army’s withdrawal of 
active combat, the military aid increased fourfold compared to that of 1984 to 1,629 million rubles. The 
most significant increase, however, occurred between 1988 and 1989 when military aid was increased by 
2,343 million rubles and stood at 3,972 million rubles more than the entire amount for the period 1980-
1987. The Figure 1. illustrates the Soviet Military aids (Minkov & Smolynec, 2007). 
The Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) reign in 1978 and especially the 1979 military 
intervention dramatically changed Soviet strategic objectives and the corresponding economic policies. 
The Soviet leadership quickly realized that the general Afghan upheaval of 1978-79 against Amin’s 
regime could not be fixed by a quick military intervention and by installing a new regime. Long term 
commitment and support in both the military and economic spheres would be necessary to stabilize the 
new government. Furthermore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked and intensified the cold war as 
the West responded to the Soviet invasion in 1980s. Shortly, Western aid started to support Afghan 
freedom fighters (Mujahidin) across the border in Pakistan and also in the form of humanitarian 
assistance to Afghan refugees.  
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Source: Minkov & Smolynec, 2007. 
 
Figure 1. Soviet Military Aid (in millions of rubles), 1980-1989 
 
The Soviet largely influenced the economic strategies of the PDPA regime through its economic 
theory and experience. The two main thrust of the economic development was to increase the state share 
of national income and bilateral trade between the two countries. However, the oil and gas industry was 
also controlled entirely by the government. The Figure 2. illustrates the importance of the gas sales 
revenue to the government. The Soviet Union largely benefited from the import of natural gas from 
Afghanistan at below market prices. 
 
 
Source: Minkov & Smolynec, 2007. 
 
Figure 2. Sales of Natural Gas as Percentage of Total Domestic Revenue 
 
Rubin (1992) stated that the natural resource exploration was controlled by the Soviet cadres and the 
gas was exported exclusively to the Soviet Union. One of the negative impacts was that income from the 
sale of gas declined when the USSR technicians began to leave the country, and had essentially 
disappeared after 1989. 
 
GEOGRAFIA OnlineTM Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 11 issue 7 (125 - 137) 129                                  
© 2015, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
 
Source: Minkov & Smolynec, 2007. 
 
Figure 3. Growth of State Revenue and Sales of Natural Gas, 1977-1988 
 
It is believed that most of the growth of the public sector was achieved through the development of 
joint ventures with the Soviet Union. In 1986, Afghan-Soviet ventures represented 75 percent of all state 
industries and produced 60% of the electricity production (Minkov & Smolynec, 2007). According to 
Giustozzi (2000), these projects produced 75 percent of the domestic revenue, with the rest coming from 
taxes and custom duties. Furthermore, Rubin (1992) asserts that the Afghan economy was to a large 
extent integrated with the Soviet economy. 
The influence and impact of USSR on the Afghan government was also seen in the coming in of 
Gorbachev. After Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the shift of economic policies in the Soviet Union 
towards joint public-private ventures were almost immediately echoed in Afghanistan as well. In 1986, 
the new Afghan leader Najibullah changed the overall direction of the economy towards greater 
representation of the private sector. In addition to building guarantees for private property into the new 
constitution, a green light was given to private investors. 
The Soviet controlled Afghan PDPA regime intensified efforts to improve agriculture as a major 
economic development. However, an effort to expand the public sector in agriculture failed. The struggle 
between the regime and the insurgency prevented any economic development in the agricultural sector. 
Furthermore, the most serious damage to the agricultural sector, however, was the Red Army’s decision 
to destroy the mujahidin economy as part of its counterinsurgency strategy (Minkov & Smolynec ,2007). 
Even though the Soviet military succeeded in preventing the mujahidin from relying on the countryside as 
an economic and supply base were successful (Rubin, 1992), they also led to hundreds of thousands of 
casualties (Minkov & Smolynec, 2007). However, Farr & Gul (1984) reported that many Afghans 
migrated during the period and the destruction of 20 percent of rural villages. The destruction caused the 
abandonment of farms and the loss of labour. By 1983 the production of wheat, rice, barley, corn and 
cotton declined by 80, 65, 40, 37, and 30 percent respectively. Yields decreased by 50 percent for dry-
land wheat and 33 percent for irrigated wheat while numbers of livestock decreased between one to two 
thirds (Rubin, 1992). 
The implications of the agricultural decline can be seen in the amount of revenue which the 
government was able to collect from land taxes. Revenue from land taxes declined from 280 million 
Afghanis in 1979 to 16 million in 1982, which could only cover 0.04 percent of government expenditures 
in that year. 
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           Source: Minkov & Smolynec, 2007. 
 
Figure 4. Afghan - Soviet Trade Patterns, 1977-1982 
 
Minkov & Smolynec (2007) citing the works of Noorzoy indicates that before the PDPA came to 
power in 1978, Afghanistan and USSR bilateral trade, was only around 30 percent of Afghanistan’s 
overall international trade. However, after the 1978 revolution, the share of exchange with the Soviet 
Union had increased to about 60 percent and 70 percent by 1982. This is shown in the Figure 4. Most 
likely the trend continued in the subsequent years. The brief peak of imports and decrease of exports in 
1979-81, observed in the graph, is most probably due to the overall lack of control by Afghan government 
on the economic resources of the country in the period and the need for external compensation.  
 
Geopolitics of Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan is synonymous with unfortunate example of a complex geopolitical and humanitarian issues 
that arise in post-conflict setting. The country has been devastated by three decades of war that have left 
most of its 32 million citizens among the poorest in the world” (Gallaher et al., 2009: 241). The history of 
conflicts in Afghanistan helps tells its geostrategic importance. The series of wars since the fall of Zahir 
Shah in 1973 has resulted in the destruction of infrastructure in the country. The numerous wars had 
caused large populations to sought asylum in neighboring or other countries. The people who live in 
Afghanistan have learned to live and survive under tough conditions. What makes Afghanistan unique is 
not its economy or resources, but its geostrategic location. It is “a valued corridor for the rich gas and oil 
resources in the Central Asian Republics to the Arabian Sea. Conversely, it gives access to the markets in 
Central Asia and therefore a country of great interest for regional and world powers” (Ram, 2004: 28).    
In 1930’s the Soviet Union was the most powerful ally of Afghanistan. In 1929, the Russians sent 
about a 1000 troops to defeat the rebels who were fighting the then Amanullah Khan. However, because 
the people were dissatisfied with Russian’s fighting in Afghanistan, Stalin ordered the troops to leave 
Afghanistan. The important point is that this invasion did not decrease the level of political relations 
between the Soviet Union and Afghan government. However, in the years before the WWII, Germans 
tried to have more influence in Afghanistan through military training and financial assistance. Under the 
influence of British and Russian governments who were allied against Germany during the war, Zahir 
Shah expelled all the German officials or personnel who were identified as intelligent agents in 
Afghanistan (Braithwaite, 2011). 
Finally, the fear of American influence in Afghanistan motivated Russians to invade Afghanistan in 
1979, though they were finally forced to leave this country in 1989 (Dmitri, 2001). This put Afghanistan’s 
sovereignty in the light of further conquest. 
GEOGRAFIA OnlineTM Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 11 issue 7 (125 - 137) 131                                  
© 2015, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
Materials and methods 
 
Method and instrument of data collection 
 
The method of data collection for the present study involved both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Quantitative data involved the use of questionnaire while qualitative data involved the use of key 
informant interview and informal discussions with respondents. A four part questionnaire was designed, 
tested and administered. In this study, the field survey was conducted within a period from April to May 
2014. Qualitative research is used to develop an in-depth understanding of human behaviour. The 
approach focuses on the reasons underpinning various aspects of behaviour and attempts to develop 
comprehensive, detailed explanations of an issue within the research (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 
2003).  
Furthermore, key informant and informal discussions were used to crosscheck some of the information 
gathered through questionnaire method. This method involved selecting five respondents purposefully to 
give unbiased information on the USSR occupation. The informants are considered to be knowledgeable 
in political affairs of Afghanistan. 
Secondary sources of data through journals, online surfing, and books were examined to complement 
primary data. However, these sources provided useful insights into the past history of the Soviet 
Afghanistan’s relations and trade. This thus allowed for critical examination of the two country's 
involvement during the Soviet occupation. 
 
Data processing and analysis  
 
A total of 120 questionnaires was distributed and at the end of the fieldwork 100 were collected in 
readiness for data processing. Nevertheless, only 88 were usable due to incomplete questionnaires. 
Therefore, 73.3 % of response rate was successfully achieved. A pilot test involving 20 respondents was 
performed in order to evaluate the reliability of instruments in the study. 
 
 
Result and discussion 
 
Table 1. showed the various respondents’ personal characteristics. As can be seen, most respondents, 42 
percent of the respondents are in the age bracket 42 and above years. A vast majority of respondents (90.9 
percent) is Muslims while most of the respondents (96.6 percent) are male. A total of 87.5 percent of the 
respondents are married. As regards to education, a majority of the respondents (37.5 percent) are 
technical/vocational degree holders. A large percentage (63.6 percent) of the respondents is civil servants. 
Most of the respondents (42.0 percent) read newspapers every day while another 64.8 percent of the 
respondents have interaction with their neighbours every day. Lastly, a majority of respondents (36.4 
percent) are of Pashtun ethnicity. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of respondents socio-demographic characteristics 
 
Age (years)  Percentage 
18 – 23  3.4 
24 – 29  9.1 
30 – 35  20.5 
36 – 41  25.0 
42 – Above  42.0 
Religion   Percentage 
Christianity  3.4 
Islam  90.9 
Traditional Belief (Pagan)  1.1 
Free Thinker  4.5 
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Age (years)  Percentage 
Gender  Percentage 
Male   96.6 
Female   3.4 
Marital status  Percentage 
Single   12.5 
Married   87.5 
Education level  Percentage 
University/polytechnic  22.7 
Technical/vocational school  37.5 
Secondary school  28.4 
Primary school  11.4 
Profession status  Percentage 
Civil servant  63.6 
Private sector employee  20.5 
Business person  15.9 
Newspaper reading level  Percentage 
Less than once/month  12.5 
Few times/month  6.8 
Few times/week  38.7 
Every day   42.0 
Interaction with neighbours  Percentage 
Few times/month  2.2 
Few times/week  33.0 
Every day   64.8 
Ethnicity  Percentage 
Pashtun    36.4 
Tajik  9.1 
Hazara   27.2 
Uzbek   9.1 
Others   18.2 
 
Political and economic investment 
 
The impact of USSR geopolitics on the Afghan people is examined as shown in Table 2. The respondents 
were asked about their perception on the income and economic conditions during the presence of the 
USSR. There were 2 items in this construct. The mean scores of the two items were 2.27 and 2.55 
respectively. The item A1 is the highest mean score since it denotes the most favourable response as 
against the A2 item.  Of the 88 respondents, 9.1 percent respondents strongly agreed that there was a 
positive change in Afghan people’s income during the presence of the USSR, 63.6 percent respondents 
agreed that there was a positive change in Afghan people’s income during the presence of the USSR, 
while 18.2 percent neither agreed nor disagreed about the item.  
 
Table 2. Impact of USSR geopolitics in Afghan 
 
No. Items  Mean score (standard 
deviation) 
Frequency (percentage) 
1 2 3 4 5 
A1 There is positive change in 
Afghan’s income after the 
presence of USSR 
2.27 (0.754)    (9.1)  (63.6)  (18.2)    (9.1)   
(0.0) 
A2 Economic situation in 
Afghanistan improved more 
with USSR 
2.55 (1.164)  (18.2)  (36.4)  (27.3)    (9.1)   
(9.1) 
N=88  Average mean score=2.39  1=strongly agree  2-agree  3-neutral  4=disagree  5=strongly disagree 
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About 9.1 percent of the respondents disagreed that there was a positive change in Afghan people’s 
income during the presence of the USSR. The reasons for the agreement of a positive in Afghans’ income 
during the USSR period 1979-1989 could be explained that at the time period, the Soviet Union was 
involved in many projects then in Afghanistan. Also, there were large economic development projects. 
However, one notable thing with construct A1 is that nobody strongly disagree with the item. 
On item A2 ‘Economic situation in Afghanistan improved more with USSR’, 18.2 percent respondents 
strongly agreed to this item, 36.4 percent  respondents also agreed while 27.3 percent respondents were 
neutral and 9.1 percent respondent chose to disagree only 9.1 percent respondents strongly disagreed that 
the economic situation in Afghanistan improved more with the USSR. Two interviewees revealed that 
their trade improved and that they were able to see sales increase and profit in their businesses. That 
enabled them to deal with family expenditures. The other three interviewees do not see any benefit of the 
presence of the USSR in 1979 – 1989 them and their families. Overall, the emerging and the constant 
theme amongst interviewees is that the presence of the USSR in 1979 - 1989 was to meet their own 
selfish desire for their home government and people.  
The mean score of the USSR and US economic and political impact was interpreted to include the 
following: 1 – 1.8 as very high, 1.81 – 2.6 as high, 2.61 – 3.4 as moderate, 3.41 – 4.2 as low and finally 
4.21 – 5.0 as very low.  The overall or average mean score for this construct is 2.41 which, shows that the 
Afghan people do not necessarily see or derive a very high positive economic and political impact during 
the USSR presence in Afghanistan. However, this indicates generally that respondents do not really show 
their agreement on the impact of USSR economic investments in their country especially in income. 
However, some of the respondents’ in the study still feel that there were some benefits during the USSR 
presence in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. Therefore, the study provided some important insights 
into the some economic impact.  
The study also examined the impact of USSR politics. Respondents were asked about their agreement 
or disagreement on whether voting was influenced by the pro - USSR candidacy, USSR is highly 
accepted by the Afghan people and if USSR presence helped reduce terrorism. The data in Table 3. were 
presented in Likert two scale responses.  However, the table indicates that there is sharp contrast or 
difference in their responses. The item A1 indicates highest agreement since it denotes the most favorable 
response as against the A2 and A3 items though the agreement was only 36.4%.  The table showed that of 
88 respondents, 36.4 percent respondents agreed that their voting was influenced by the pro - USSR 
candidacy, 63.6 percent respondents disagreed that their voting was influenced by the pro - USSR 
candidacy. 
 
Table 3. Impact of USSR political in Afghan 
 
No  Items  Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
A1 Voting was influenced by pro-USSR 36.4 63.6 
A2 USSR highly accepted by Afghan 18.2 81.8 
A3 USSR presence reduced insurgence and terrorism 27.3 72.7 
 
On the item A2 ‘USSR highly accepted by Afghan’ data showed that 18.2 percent respondents agreed 
that USSR were highly accepted by the Afghan people while, 81.8 percent respondents disagreed USSR 
was highly accepted by the Afghan people. The item A3 ‘USSR presence helped reduced insurgence and 
terrorism’ findings indicated that 27.3 percent respondents agreed that the USSR presence helped reduced 
insurgence and terrorism while, 72.7 percent respondents disagreed that the USSR presence helped 
reduced insurgence and terrorism. 
Of the five informants interviewed, four showed a theme response that the people of Afghanistan are 
against the USSR occupation of their land and believe that Afghan will be better off in the absence of the 
USSR. Moreso, the belief that the Afghan is further divided by the presence of the USSR in their soil and 
that it could be the plan of the USSR to further drift or tear them apart. Three interviewees were of the 
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view that insurgence and terrorism will never go in as much as there are the foreign meddling powers in 
Afghan. 
 
The influence of the USSR economic investment by education 
 
The Table 4. using one-way ANOVA test, shows that there was not a significant difference of influence of 
USSR economic investment by level of education, university/polytechnic (Mean=4.85), 
technical/vocational (Mean =4. 69), secondary (Mean =5.08) and primary (Mean=4.50), value of F=.387 
with p>0.05. Based on the analysis reported in this section, the perspective of participants with secondary 
education has the highest mean value, however; the influence of USSR economy was insignificant. The 
mean value of technical/vocational has the smallest mean value depicting the lower number of 
participants that participated in the study. 
 
Table 4. The influence of the USSR economic investment by level of education 
 
Variables Sources  of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Influence USSR 
Economic Invesment 
Between Groups 3.231 3 1.077 .387 .763 
Within Groups 233.860 84 2.784   
Total 237.091 87    
Influence USSR Politic 
Invesment 
Between Groups 24.058 3 8.019 10.656 .000 
Within Groups 63.215 84 .753   
Total 87.273 87    
Influence USSR On 
Afghanistan’s Foreign 
Policy 
Between Groups 91.174 3 30.391 10.553 .000 
Within Groups 241.917 84 2.880   
Total 333.091 87    
 
Nonetheless, there was a significant difference of influence of USSR politics by level of education, 
university/polytechnic (Mean=5.60), technical/vocational (Mean =6.12), secondary (Mean =5.40) and 
primary (Mean=7.10), value of F=10.656 with p<0.05.  Based on Post hoc analyses that were conducted, 
indicated that the mean score for the influence of USSR politics in the group of primary (Mean=7. 10) 
more than university/polytechnic (Mean=5.60), technical/vocational (Mean =6.12) and secondary 
(Mean=5.40). However, the influence of USSR politics in the group university/polytechnic (Mean=5.60), 
technical/vocational (Mean =6.12) and secondary (Mean=5.40) did not significantly differ. The mean 
value of the participants depicted that greater respondents constituted primary education level while 
participants at secondary education level. This implies that more respondents from primary education 
level contributed more on the data that were used to generalize the influences of USSR on the political 
sphere of Afghans between 1979 through to 1989. ANOVA statistical analysis showed that the USSR 
politics significantly supported government practices.  
 
The influence of USSR economic investment by profession 
 
The Table 5. examined the difference of variables by profession of the respondents. These variables are 
the influence of the USSR economic investment, the influence of the USSR politics and the influence of 
the USSR on Afghanistan’s foreign policy. 
Using one-way ANOVA test, Table 5. indicates that there was no significant difference between the 
influence of the USSR economic investment by profession, civil servant (Mean=4.98), business person 
(Mean =4.50) and private sector employee (Mean=4.55), value of F=.760 with p>0.05. As the analysis 
report indicate in this section, the perspective of participants in the civil servants has the highest mean 
value, however the influence of USSR economy was insignificant. The mean value of business persons 
has the smallest mean value depicting the lower number of participants that participated in the study. 
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Table 5. The influence of the USSR economic investment by profession 
 
Variables Sources  of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Influence USSR 
Economic Investment 
Between Groups 4.164 2 2.082 .760 .471 
Within Groups 232.927 85 2.740   
Total 237.091 87    
Influence USSR Politic 
Investment 
Between Groups 1.844 2 .922 .917 .403 
Within Groups 85.429 85 1.005   
Total 87.273 87    
Influence USSR On 
Afghanistan’s Foreign 
Policy 
Between Groups 104.752 2 52.376 19.497 .000 
Within Groups 228.339 85 2.686   
Total 333.091 87    
 
Moreover, it also indicates that there was no significant difference found in the Influence of the USSR 
politic by Profession, civil servant (Mean=5.92), business person (Mean=6.14) and private sector 
employee (Mean=5.66), value of F=.917 with p>0.05.  
Minkov & Smolynec (2007) stated that the Afghan regime took to the Soviet economic practices in 
land redistribution in agricultural economy and introduced state farms and agricultural cooperatives. 
These practices, however, collided with traditional Afghan and Islamic values and only served to alienate 
the farmers and the landed elite. 
 
The influence of the USSR economic investment by ethnicity 
 
In the Table 6. shows the difference of variables by the ethnicity of respondents. These variables are the 
influence of the USSR economic investment, the influence of the USSR political investment and the 
influence of the USSR on Afghanistan’s foreign policy. This was to verify whether the impact was felt by 
variations of tribe in Afghanistan. 
 
Table 6. The influence of the USSR economic investment by ethnicity 
 
Variables Sources  of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Influence USSR 
Economic Investment 
Between Groups 147.091 4 36.773 33.913 .000 
Within Groups 90.000 83 1.084   
Total 237.091 87    
Influence USSR Politic 
Investment 
Between Groups 23.939 4 5.985 7.843 .000 
Within Groups 63.333 83 .763   
Total 87.273 87    
Influence USSR on 
Afghanistan’s Foreign 
Policy 
Between Groups 167.758 4 41.939 21.054 .000 
Within Groups 165.333 83 1.992   
Total 333.091 87    
 
In the Table 6. using one-way ANOVA test, there was significant difference on the influence of the 
USSR economic investment by ethnicity, Pashtun (Mean=6.25), Uzbek (Mean=6.00), Hazara 
(Mean=4.00), Tajik (Mean=3.00) and others (Mean=3.50), value of F=33.913 with p<0.05. Based on Post 
hoc analyses that were conducted, the influence of the USSR economic investment in the group of 
Pashtun (Mean=6.25) and Uzbek (Mean=6.00) more than Hazara (Mean =4.00), Tajik (Mean =3.00) and 
others (Mean=3.50). However, the influence of USSR economic investment in the group of Hazara 
(Mean=4.00), Tajik (Mean=3.00) and others (Mean=3.50) did not significantly differ. The mean value of 
the participants portrayed that greater respondents constituted Pashtun and Uzbek ethnics while 
participant of Tajik ethnics. This implies that more respondents from Pashtun and Uzbek ethnics 
contributed more on the data that were used to generalize the influences of USSR economically 
significant between 1979 through to 1989. ANOVA statistical analysis showed that the USSR’s 
significantly influence Afghan government economically. 
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Furthermore, there was significant difference on the influence of the USSR politics by ethnicity, 
Pashtun (Mean=6.25), Uzbek (Mean =5.00), Hazara (Mean =5.33), Tajik (Mean =6.00) and others 
(Mean=6.50), value of F=7.843 with p<0.05.  Based on Post hoc analyses that were conducted, the 
influence of the USSR politics in the group of others (Mean=6.50) more than Uzbek (Mean =5.00). 
However, the influence of the USSR politics in the group of Pashtun (Mean=6.25), Hazara (Mean=5.33) 
and Tajik (Mean =6.00) did not significantly differ. The mean value of the participants portrayed that 
greater respondents constituted other ethnics while participant of Uzbek ethnics. This implies that more 
respondents from other ethnics contributed more on the data that were used to generalize the influences of 
USSR politics significant between 1979 through to 1989. ANOVA statistical analysis showed that the 
USSR’s politics significantly influence Afghan government. 
Barfield (2010) also argues that ethnicity is a factor in resistance against foreign powers in 
Afghanistan. In general, non-Pashtuns are currently more tolerant of American’s presence in Afghanistan. 
Based on Barfield’s (2010) argument, ethnicity of the Afghan population plays a role in the people’s 
inclination toward Russian policies in Afghanistan.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The key location of Afghanistan, bordering Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, has long made this 
country an important geopolitical prize for neighboring states and external powers.  The impact of USSR 
economic investment and politics between 1979 and 1989 in Afghanistan has been investigated. Based on 
the research findings, USSR geopolitics has a positive impacts in Afghanistan, especially in the 
socioeconomic factors such as education level, ethnicity and by professionals. However, there are some 
negative impacts as well as the respondents’ believe that Afghan will never achieve peace and stability in 
the presence of the USSR and US in Afghanistan. The current instability in the Afghanistan’s government 
and system makes it worth re-examining estimates regarding the future on the USSR. Despite all the 
NATO coalitions known as Allied Force and the international aid donors the government is yet to claim 
total control of the Afghanistan people in terms of governance. The effect of the USSR occupation of 
Afghanistan has been catastrophic for the development of the Afghan economy. The evidence suggests a 
serious decline in the gross national product (GNP) and the abandonment of many Soviet-aided industrial 
projects which had been completed or were under construction by 1989. With its agricultural base 
adversely affected by war and collectivization, the country has also become a net food importer after 
being a net exporter in previous years. In addition, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has lessened the 
prospects for beneficial Western economic involvement through both trade and aid transactions. Although 
living conditions were never high by world standards, the current situation at best can be considered grim.  
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